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SOCIAL SELECTIVITY OF TRACK
MOBILITY IN SECONDARY SCHOOLS
A comparison of intra-secondary transitions
in Germany and The Netherlands
Marita Jacob and Nicole Tieben
Faculty of Social Sciences, Mannheim University, A5, Mannheim 68131, Germany
ABSTRACT: Previous research has shown that track mobility during
secondary education is influenced by parental background. However, family
background effects might vary due to institutional variations in the
educational structure. Therefore, in our paper we compare social selectivity
of track mobility in two countries, Germany and The Netherlands. Both
countries offer a hierarchically tracked educational system, but differ in
details. Further, both countries established educational reforms in the late
sixties, changing the conditions for track mobility differently. In our empirical
analyses using data from the Family Survey Dutch Population and the German
Life History Study we find that changing to a higher track is more likely for
students who face the threat of status demotion, whereas changing to a
lower track is independent of status maintenance motives. Intra-secondary
transitions occur less often in The Netherlands than in Germany and are less
motivated by status maintenance. Educational legislation reduces the
effects of relative education of the parents only on upward mobility in
Germany and only on downward mobility in The Netherlands.
Key words: secondary education; educational system; social selectivity;
track mobility; transition research
1. Introduction
In most European educational systems students have to decide between
different tracks within secondary education. A division into vocational and
general higher secondary tracks after lower secondary school is common
in, e.g., Sweden, Italy and Germany. In the German-speaking countries
and in The Netherlands, general secondary education is tracked as well












































primary school. Proponents of this tracked structure claim that students
are allocated according to their performance. Another advantage of tracked
systems is that a homogenous performance level can be reached within
schools (cf. Gamoran and Mare 1989; Hallinan 1996). Several empirical
studies on social inequality at the entry into (lower) secondary education,
however, unequivocally come to the conclusion that tracked educational
systems tend to be highly selective at a very early age and that the track
entered after primary school largely determines the subsequent educa-
tional career (e.g., Baumert et al. 2001; Breen and Jonsson 2000, for
Sweden; Lucas 1999, for USA). However, a requirement to correct track
placement can arise from an erratic initial allocation or from an
unexpected development of the learning progress after entry into
secondary education. Thus, initial track allocation is not necessarily the
final destination, as mobility between tracks is possible.
From the perspective of social stratification the issue of track mobility
becomes particularly relevant when corrections of initial track placement
occur in a socially selective way and thus either serve to secure advantages
of privileged groups or to compensate for disadvantages. Previous research
has shown that, for example, in Germany the likelihood of children from
privileged families to make upward transitions is above average, either
before or after their first diploma (Henz 1997a,b; Hillmert and Jacob
2005). In our paper we extend this research by using the parents’
educational level in relation to the child’s track placement and the child’s
educational attainment. In other words, we compare parental education
with the initial track placement and the first attained schooling degree,
and argue that corrections of the initial track are carried out in particular
when the track placement of the student is lower than the educational
attainment of the parents. Hence, we test if the assumption of a relative
risk aversion (Breen and Goldthorpe 1997) holds for intra-secondary
mobility in the same way as for the scheduled transition between primary
and secondary education.
To examine the influence of the institutional setting on that particular
educational decision, we compare two countries, Germany and The
Netherlands. By comparing two hierarchically tracked educational systems
we will answer the question whether and in what respect social selectivity of
track mobility differs in the two countries due to different institutional
structures.1 Germany and The Netherlands qualify for such a comparison
because the two educational systems bear comparable features in lower
secondary general education. Both systems offer hierarchically ordered
1. Previous research has shown that the effects of family background on final educational
attainment appear to be considerably lower in The Netherlands than in Germany






































tracks, with possibilities to upgrade one’s educational career by changing
to a more demanding and prestigious track or to downgrade to a lower
track. Even after having completed a particular track successfully, the final
(secondary) educational level may be attained later by completing a higher
track. However, the two systems differ in detail, for example, regarding
track-allocation criteria, curricula or spatial separation of the different
schools. Furthermore, we investigate in how far educational reforms with
the aim to increase permeability between tracks and reduce educational
inequality in both countries had different effects on the social selectivity of
track mobility.
In the following we will give a short introduction of the micro-
theoretical background, outline the two educational systems and their
changes during the past decades, and derive hypotheses concerning
selectivity of track mobility in both countries and their changes over time.
In chapter four we will test our hypotheses using data from the German
Life History Study and the Family Survey of the Dutch Population.
2. Theoretical background
2.1. Educational decisions and intra-secondary transitions
2.1.1. The rational choice approach for educational decisions: Acknowledging
that there are social differences in schooling performance due to the
different distribution of cultural and educational resources in the family of
origin / so-called ‘primary’ effects (e.g., Boudon 1974; De Graaf 1984; De
Graaf et al. 2000) / rational choice theory concentrates on the parameters
influencing educational decisions beyond measured performance (‘sec-
ondary’ effects). The rational choice approach assumes that individuals
make their educational decisions based on the perceived ratio of utility,
costs and risk (cf. Erikson and Jonsson 1996; Breen and Goldthorpe 1997).
Regarding costs of education, children with a high socioeconomic
background profit from material resources which enable their parents to
bear the direct and indirect costs of education. Further, highly educated
parents consider the risk of failure in higher education more realistic and
lower than parents who have not attended higher education. Extending
this theoretical approach, the core argument of more recent approaches to
explain social differences in decisions is the relative risk aversion (Breen
and Goldthorpe 1997; Need and Jong 2001; Davies et al. 2002; van de
Werfhorst and Andersen 2005; Breen and Yaish 2006; Stocke´ 2007):
individuals avoid downward social mobility respectively strive to maintain
the family’s social position across generations. In the same way, this
mechanism of relative risk aversion prevents children from lower educated
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parents to strive for an education higher than necessary to maintain their
family’s status, because the utility of a higher educational attainment
would not outweigh the additional cost.
Status maintenance can best be guaranteed by pursuing an educational
level that maximizes the chance to receive the same status. Following
Breen and Yaish (2006) who discuss the difficulty of accurately proxying
the beliefs of students about which level of schooling might be sufficient to
reproduce the social status of their parents, we assume that students have
only a limited (myopic) view on the returns to their educational attainment
and their future class position. Focussing on parental education as the
relevant factor for decisions regarding secondary school is empirically
supported by analyses of van de Werfhorst and Andersen (2005) for the
US showing that intergenerational changes in the value of education for
the labour market only have an impact on the decision to enter tertiary
education but not on earlier transitions. Similar results are found by van
de Werfhorst (2005) for Dutch data.
The rational choice approach has largely been used for the ‘standard’
transitions within educational systems, namely those from primary to
secondary education and from secondary to tertiary education (e.g.,
Jackson et al. 2007). However, the central parameters of the theory can also
be applied to the decision-making process for transitions within secondary
education in a hierarchically tracked system: previous research showed
that high status parents indeed strive for a higher initial track placement of
their children and in most cases successfully, but in educational systems
where track allocation is mainly performance driven, students may be
allocated to a track below their own respectively their parents’ aspirations.
The ‘rational’ desire for a certain track placement thus can be frustrated
by institutional constraints and lead to an ‘irrational’ track placement.
Obtaining a graduation from this track would be a serious threat to status
maintenance, which is a strong incentive to strive for a correction of the
initial track. On the other hand, a student may also be initially placed in a
track which is appropriate for status maintenance but emerges to be too
demanding. In cases of a mismatch between performance, actual track
allocation and desired track allocation, therefore the need or desire for a
correction of track placement can emerge. In the case of over-performance
the question arises whether to change to a more demanding track leading
to a higher graduation that might now be appropriate for status
maintenance. In the case of under-performance of the student, changing
to a lower track can restore the match between performance and track level
but also bears a high risk of status demotion. In the following, we describe
the different types of intra-secondary transitions and their consequences







































2.1.2. Intra-secondary transitions and social selectivity: We define three
types of intra-secondary transitions. Students can either change tracks
before they obtain a first graduation or afterwards. Upgrades and
downgrades occur before graduation while a supplement diploma can be
attained after graduation from a lower track. In the following we outline
these different options.
Downgrading is mainly an option when the current educational track is
too demanding and the student is at risk to fail the term. Changing to a
lower and less demanding track disburdens the student and increases his/
her chance to complete the term and to continue education successfully. A
quite common alternative to downgrades is grade retention, i.e., staying in
the current track, repeating the term and continuing afterwards. Grade
retention bears the additional direct and indirect costs of one more year in
education, while downgrading in most cases even reduces schooling years.
In order to come to a decision, the student has to balance the risk of status
demotion against the direct and indirect costs of one additional year of
education. As discussed above, we assume that parents strive to ensure at
least the same educational level for their children as their own. Hence a
student who would end up in a lower track than the secondary educational
level of the parents is more likely to repeat the term instead of
downgrading, while students who already are in a higher track than their
parents are probably less eager to stay and rather avoid the additional
costs.2
Upgrading is an option for students whose performance is above
expectations. A higher secondary diploma is particularly attractive if the
parents’ educational level cannot be reached in the current track. But
upgrading also bears several costs. First, as the curriculum is more
demanding than in the track previously attended, the risk of failure
increases and the student has to make efforts to catch up with the higher
level. Second, transaction costs usually involve changing the familiar
environment and getting acquainted with a new situation, teachers,
friends, etc. Third, higher tracks are longer and thus involve more direct
and indirect costs. In sum, upgrading has a lot of drawbacks which might
prevent children from taking this step.
Supplement diplomas are an alternative to upgrading. A student can
graduate in the current track and attain a ‘supplement diploma’ afterwards.
Compared with an upgrade, supplement diplomas after first graduation
are a ‘safe’ option as the lower track has already been completed. If the
2. One might also assume that parental support to improve a child’s school performance
also differs between different parental backgrounds. These ‘primary’ effects of social
origin would not alter our expectations but strenghten the relative advantages of
children with relatively higher educated parents for upgrading.
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student fails s/he has no risk of leaving education without any diploma.
However, as the learning progress is faster in the higher track the gap
between students in different tracks grows over time (Gamoran and Mare
1989; Hallinan 1996). Therefore, the effort of catching up might be higher
the longer the student waits. So in their decision between upgrade and
supplement, students have to balance the lower risk of failure of an early
transition against the higher transaction costs, and they have to trade in
the ‘safe’ option of easily obtaining a lower graduation.
To summarize, under- and over-performance each offer two alternatives
how to proceed in secondary school. We argue that the decision for either
alternative is at least partly driven by motives of status maintenance, which
are working independently of performance. A core point in these decisions
is risk aversion: if intergenerational status maintenance is threatened either
by underperformance or by lower initial track placement of the child,
parents will prefer the alternative which enables them to maintain or reach
the desired educational level.
These arguments lead us to the following general hypotheses on social
selectivity of track mobility: children who would experience status demotion
by downgrading are less likely to downgrade than children who will not
descend by downgrading from the current track. Vice versa, children who
cannot reach the secondary educational level of their parents in the current
track are more likely to upgrade or to take a supplement.
2.2. Social selectivity in intra-secondary transitions in Germany and
The Netherlands
2.2.1. The institutional setting of the German and the Dutch education system:
2.2.1.1. GERMANY Despite being different in detail, the structure of
the educational system of Germany is standardized in general lines
throughout all 16 federal states (schematic illustration of the education
system see Figure 1). Compulsory education starts at the age of six years,
when children enter primary school, which usually lasts four years. At the
age of ten most students have to choose between three different tracks:
Volks-/Hauptschule, Realschule, and Gymnasium. Volks-/Hauptschule is the
least demanding and least prestigious track. It lasts for five years.
Realschule takes six years and is more demanding than Hauptschule; it
leads to an intermediate secondary qualification. Gymnasium offers a nine-
year pre-academic course.3 This track is the most demanding and most
3. Besides the classical Gymnasium, there are also vocationally oriented Gymnasien,
which offer a more specific education. The premises for obtaining the Abitur are







































prestigious track in Germany. Graduation from the Gymnasium, the
Abitur, qualifies students for access to all post-secondary and tertiary
institutions.
2.2.1.2. THE NETHERLANDS Most Dutch students enter the
educational system at the age of four since pre-school and primary school
were centralized to form the basisonderwijs in 1984. Full compulsory
schooling begins at the age of six, pupils will then remain for six years in
primary education and choose between four different tracks (LBO,
MAVO, HAVO, VWO) afterwards (see Figure 1). The structure and
contents of these tracks resemble those of the German educational system,
with LBO (four years) and MAVO (four years) being equivalent to
Hauptschule and Realschule, and VWO (six years) being equivalent to
Gymnasium. The only exception is HAVO (five years), which offers
intermediate general education but qualifies students for direct entry into
lower tier tertiary education (vocational colleges). Universities give
admission only to VWO graduates.
2.2.1.3. REFORMS In both countries, educational reforms at the end of
the 1960s had the aim to make the educational systems more flexible and
to facilitate intra-secondary transitions (for an overview see Cortina et al.
2003: 138f; van der Heiden 2004). For example, early tracking was
postponed by the introduction of intermediate years, and track allocation
was improved by teacher recommendations after primary education. Also,
the strict separation of tracks was loosened by converging curricula. This
reduced the effort of catching up on the more advanced level in case of an
upgrade or supplement and made these less risky. However, in both
countries, these reforms were not established consistently and are still
partly restricted to regions or federal states.
Figure 1. Schematic illustration of the Dutch and the German educational systems
and the possibilities to upgrade, downgrade and supplement.
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Summing up, both educational systems are similar regarding rather
early track differentiation compared to other European countries. Hence,
the two systems qualify for comparison by showing how minor variation in
the rigidity of track differentiation influences the impact of social origin on
educational choices (here: on track mobility during secondary school).
Against the background of an ongoing German discussion about providing
more permeability between tracks (Ro¨sner 1997; Ro¨sner and Mauthe
1998) and the current efforts of some federal states to combine Haupt- and
Realschule into one organisational or even comprehensive unit, taking The
Netherlands as a comparable case might give valuable insights.
2.2.2. Social selectivity in a comparative perspective: The educational
reforms probably had ambiguous effects on track mobility. The improved
opportunity to supplement after first graduation is an alternative to early
upgrading and may cause students to postpone an upgrade. Besides, both
countries improved initial track allocation and thereby probably reduced
erratic placement and the need for corrections. As a result of increased
participation in higher tracks the (statistical) risk to upgrade decreases
even further while the risk to downgrade increases over time. On the other
hand, track mobility was facilitated through the harmonization of
curricula in both countries. It is therefore hardly possible to predict
how far the quantity of intra-secondary transition has changed over time.
However, the harmonization of the curricula in both countries removed
academic barriers for upward corrections by reducing the efforts to catch
up. Upgrading and supplements became less risky and therefore more
attractive for students who were not driven by status maintenance. This
leads us to the hypothesis on social selectivity over time: social selectivity of
upgrades and supplements decreases over time (after reforms) in both
countries.
Nevertheless, Germany and The Netherlands differ with respect to the
pathways to a supplement. In Germany, students can continue in the
subsequent term right away, while Dutch students have to repeat one year
in the higher track.4 The advantage of the latter might be that the risk of
failure in The Netherlands is smaller because students get prepared for the
challenges of the higher track in the repetition year. This advantage might
4. To be eligible for a supplement, certain conditions have to be fulfilled. The premises
vary between federal states, but in general a successful completion of lower or medium
secondary school is necessary. This is usually the case when an average grade-level has
been achieved in the main subjects. For example, to be eligible to attend classes for a
supplement after Hauptschule, besides having achieved certain grades of previous
graduation students have to fulfil additional requirements, like additional classes in







































be offset by the increased opportunity costs of the additional year, though.
Replacing one obstacle by another probably results in a stable selectivity of
supplements in The Netherlands.
From these considerations we derive the following hypotheses on country
differences in social selectivity of supplements: social selectivity of supple-
ments decreases in Germany after the introduction of the reforms, but
does not decrease in The Netherlands, because the reduced transaction
costs are counterbalanced by increased opportunity costs.
3. Data, operationalizations and methods
Analysing track mobility and the attainment of a second schooling
certificate cannot be done by using cross-sectional data, as they usually
contain only the highest educational attainment of respondents. We
therefore need data on complete educational careers, including long-
itudinal information about transitions within and after secondary educa-
tion. For Germany, the retrospective longitudinal study of the (West-)
German Life History Study (GLHS) conducted by the Max Planck
Institute in Berlin provides such datasets for several German birth
cohorts. For our analyses we use the information of cohorts born in 1939/
41, 1949/51, 1954/55, 1959/61, 1964, and 1971. We can use 6319
respondents for the empirical analyses. For The Netherlands, we use the
Family Surveys Dutch Population (FSDP), a four-wave (1993, 1998, 2000,
2003) cross-section study on a representative sample of the Dutch
population containing detailed information about educational careers of
the respondents and their family of origin. Unlike the Life History Study,
these data are not a cohort study but comprise respondents from all birth
years between 1914 and 1985. Because of the differences in the data
structure, we cannot pool both datasets and analyse the countries
simultaneously. All analyses are therefore run separately for Germany
and The Netherlands. In order to ensure comparability between the two
datasets as far as possible, we excluded all those respondents from the
Dutch data who were born before 1935 and after 1970. This leaves us with
5609 respondents for The Netherlands.
We analyse transitions within the general tracks of secondary education
as specified in the above description of the two educational systems, thus
Hauptschule, Realschule and Gymnasium5 in Germany, and LBO, MAVO,
HAVO, and VWO in The Netherlands. In the German case, we also
5. Other German schools that cannot be clearly assigned to one of the tracks by
attendance, such as Gesamtschule, schools for special needs, and Reformpa¨dagogische
Schule, are summarised as ‘other schools’ in the analyses.
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include certificates of general education that are obtained within vocational
education by passing an extra exam. In the Dutch case, upgrades,
downgrades and supplements are defined analogously, but post-secondary
vocational institutions like MBO do not offer independent general
secondary qualifications.6 In the multivariate analyses we use multinomial
logistic regressions. The dependent variable consists of four categories: ‘no
change’, ‘upgrade’, ‘downgrade’, and ‘supplement’. Respondents who
made a transition to the same school type, e.g., for reasons of relocation,
were assigned to the ‘no change’ category. In the German case, transitions
which could not doubtlessly be categorized as up- or downgrades, e.g.,
from or into a Gesamtschule, are called ‘ambiguous transitions’ and form a
fifth category. The reference category is students who obtained a
secondary diploma without changing tracks before or after first gradua-
tion.
The family background considered here is the formal education of the
highest educated parent. In The Netherlands, the parents’ education is
operationalised by lower secondary school or less (low-educated parents),
higher secondary or vocational training (medium), and tertiary education
(high), whereas in Germany we use the schooling certificates of the
highest educated parent: no graduation/Hauptschule (low), graduation
from Realschule (medium), and Abitur (high). The motive of status
maintenance (via education) is operationalised directly by using the
relative educational level of the parents compared to the child’s in a
dichotomous variable: if the student enters a lower track than the final
secondary graduation of the highest educated parent, the variable is coded
1, otherwise 0. Changes across time are tested with cohort dummies. For
comparability, the respondents of the Dutch Family Survey are clustered
into cohorts that grossly correspond with the cohorts of the German Life
History Study. As we do not analyse separate tracks for reasons of
economy, we use dummies for the initial secondary track chosen at the first
transition from primary to secondary education. These dummies are
introduced as control variables to ensure that no bias from shifting
allocation distribution distorts our results. We also introduce an interac-
tion between relative parental education and the cohorts which profited
from the educational reforms in the late sixties/early seventies.
In order to represent students who changed tracks more than once, we
constructed ‘person-transition’ files. The records in these files represent
transitions instead of respondents so that sequential transitions can be
analysed simultaneously. The relative education of the parents and the
6. Post-secondary non-tertiary educational tracks, like MBO in The Netherlands and
Berufsschulen/Berufsfachschulen in Germany, are not defined as supplements if a






































initial track can thus vary within the same respondent due to upgrades and
downgrades and are adapted where necessary.
4. Results
4.1. Descriptive results
4.1.1. Initial track allocation: Probabilities for intra-secondary transitions
are structured by the distribution of students into the different tracks after
they leave primary school. Figure 2 shows initial track allocation in both
countries by cohort. Educational expansion seems to be more dramatic in
Germany than in The Netherlands. We observe a strong decrease in
participation in the Hauptschule, and participation in the Gymnasium
almost tripled in Germany, while the growth in VWO in The Netherlands
is modest and seems to be offset by an increased participation in HAVO.
With regard to the two youngest cohorts born in 1964 and 1971, the
introduction of new school types like Gesamtschule is reflected in the
German data, as more than ten percent of the respondents entered one of
those.
Track allocation to intermediate and higher tracks is not only increasing
over time but also depends on the educational background of the parents.
In both countries initial track allocation is strongly related to parental
education, but to a lesser extent in The Netherlands than in Germany (see
Tables 1 and 2). Regarding the more relevant variable ‘relative parents’
education’ for status maintenance, 524 of all students (9%) in Germany
are placed initially in a lower track than their parents’ educational level. In
The Netherlands, the share of children attending a school below their
parents’ level is higher. In total, 728 students (13%) entered secondary
school at a level below their parents. This indicates that initial track
allocation is less driven by parental education in The Netherlands than in
Germany.
4.1.2. Track mobility and educational supplements: In the German data, we
observe 1646 intra-secondary transitions of the 6319 respondents. Of these
respondents, 120 made more than one transition during secondary
education. Pooling all transitions results in 423 upgrades, 297 downgrades,
and 748 supplements.7 In The Netherlands, we observed 908 transitions
of 5553 respondents, but only 58 of these made more than one transition.
In total we observe 67 upgrades, 346 downgrades and 495 supplements.
7. As we observe students with more than one intra-secondary transition, the total
number of transitions exceeds the number of respondents. We also observe 178
transitions that cannot be classified as upgrade, downgrade or supplement.
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In the following, we use the pooled data of all transitions for our analyses.
Hence, the population of our analyses is not respondents, but records
(episodes) in a ‘person-transition’ file.
Figure 3 shows the distribution of the different forms of track mobility
across cohorts in Germany and The Netherlands. In Germany, the share
of upgrades among all transitions increases until the 1964 cohort and
Netherlands

































































































TABLE 1. Initial track choice after primary education by parents’ education, Germany
Germany Parents’ education (column percent) Relative parents’ education (row percent)
Track Low Medium High Total
Same or lower
level Higher level Total N
Haupt-/Volksschule 62.6 27.0 13.7 49.2 88.9 16.4 100 2956
Realschule 18.4 24.2 12.3 18.8 93.1 6.9 100 1125
Gymnasium 15.0 40.4 64.1 26.4 100.0 0 100 1628
Other schools 4.1 8.4 10.0 5.7
Total 100 100 100 100
N 4041 1187 782 6010















































































































TABLE 2. Initial track choice after primary education by parents’ education, The Netherlands
The Netherlands Parents’ education (column percent) Relative parents’ education (row percent)
Track Low Medium High Total Same or lower level Higher level Total N
LBO 55.8 32.5 7.8 36.2 85.5 14.9 100 1959
MAVO 33.4 42.4 29.5 37.9 83.9 16.1 100 2047
HAVO 5.5 10.8 18.8 10.3 65.9 17.3 100 557
VWO 5.3 14.2 44.0 15.6 100.0 0 100 844
Total 100 100 100 100
N 1652 3009 746 5407





















































































declines afterwards. A similar curvilinear development can be observed for
the supplements and downgrades, while the share of ambiguous transi-
tions is increasing constantly. In The Netherlands, a curvilinear trend with
a peak in the 1956/60 cohorts can only be observed for supplements. We
find minor fluctuations without a clear trend for downgrades and
upgrades. In The Netherlands, the supplement is clearly preferred to
the upgrade, while in Germany upgrades are a fairly well-established
strategy to reach a higher educational level. The dynamics may be partly
explained by the educational expansion in the two countries, which causes
shifts in the risk populations for upgrades/supplements and downgrades.
In Germany, a large proportion of the respondents was allocated to the
lowest track in the oldest cohorts. Due to the increasing participation in
Netherlands



























































Figure 3. Distribution of intra-secondary transitions by cohort.
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the medium and higher tracks, the risk group for downgrading is growing
over time. In The Netherlands, the participation in intermediate tracks
was at a comparatively high level in the earliest cohorts already. However,
despite the decrease in risk groups for upgrades and supplements in both
countries, we observe an increase in upward corrections. The demand for
upward corrections has thus increased over time and was possibly even
enhanced by the improved permeability after the reforms. It has to be
pointed out, however, that the increase can be observed clearly before the
reforms were established in both countries, namely for students born in
the early to mid-fifties, which indicates that the reforms did not
necessarily trigger off this boom of intra-secondary transitions. There is
hardly any additional increase after the introduction of the reforms, and in
the successive cohorts the number of corrections declines again.
4.1.3. Education of the parents: Considering the relative education of the
parents to the child’s, in Germany 45 percent of the students who are
placed in a track lower than their parents change that track (Figure 4). In
The Netherlands, the proportion is substantially lower, as only a quarter of
students who are below their parents’ education change tracks. Upward
corrections clearly dominate. In both countries the rate of track mobility is
considerably lower when the parental education is equal or lower than that
of the student, while downgrades in particular are more likely here than in
the former group.
4.2. Multivariate analyses
In the following we estimate a set of multinomial logit regressions. We ran
three nested models: in the first model only sex and relative parental
education are included for testing bivariately the relative risk aversion
hypotheses. In the second model we add the educational level of the
parents, cohort dummies and the current track. Introducing the absolute
and relative education of the parents simultaneously allows us to identify
the net effect of parents’ relative education. Hence, by isolating the net
effect, we derive the strength of status maintenance as motivator for intra-
secondary transitions but exclude confounded effects of parental educa-
tion as such, taking into consideration that only higher educated parents
can have a higher relative education than their children. To test for a
varying influence of parents’ relative education over time, an interaction
term consisting of a dummy for post-reform cohorts and relative
education of parents is included in the third model. In Germany, the
post-reforms cohorts are those born 1964 and 1971, in The Netherlands






































In Germany (Table 3), gender does not influence the relative risk to
upgrade, while boys are more likely to downgrade and take a supplement
than girls. As predicted, the relative education of the parents has positive
effects on upward corrections (upgrade and supplement) and negative
effects on downgrades.
Model I seems to confirm the hypotheses of relative risk aversion in
intra-secondary transitions. The relative education of the parents has
strong effects on all types of intra-secondary transitions which remain
significant for upgrades and supplements under control of absolute
parental education, initial track and cohort in model II. Interestingly,
the upgrades in Germany especially seem to be driven by the motive of
status maintenance, while it is rather the absolute education of the parents












































Figure 4. Intra-secondary transitions by relative education of the parents.
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TABLE 3. Intra-secondary transitions (UP upgrades, DN downgrades, SP supplements), multinomial regression (Odds ratios), robust standard errors,
Germany
Model I Model II Model III
Germany UP DN SP UP DN SP UP DN SP
Sex ( ) 1.000 1.460** 1.622*** .968 1.546** 1.648*** 0.970 1.544** 1.648***
Education parents higher 4.146*** 0.169** 3.043*** 2.084** 1.337 1.551* 2.952** 1.580 2.137**
Parents’ education
Hauptschule or lower ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref.
Realschule 1.393 0.721* 1.600** 1.382 0.719* 1.576**
Gymnasium 1.848 0.505** 2.147** 1.804* 0.507** 2.104**
Cohort
193941; 194951 ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref.
195455 7.900*** 2.131** 4.229*** 8.301*** 2.169** 4.404***
195961 16.70*** 2.146** 4.215*** 17.39*** 2.152** 4.366***
1964 15.12*** 2.763*** 2.033*** 17.25*** 2.807*** 2.330***
1971 14.35*** 1.868* 2.622*** 16.52*** 1.902* 3.050***
Initial track resp. first graduation
Hauptschule 0.766* 0.000 0.468*** 0.775 0.000 0.475***
Realschule ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref.
Gymnasium 0.000 1.518** 0.000*** 0.000 1.511** 0.000***




Pseudo R2 0.0254 .2220 0.2231






















































































Model I Model II Model III
Germany UP DN SP UP DN SP UP DN SP
N (Events) 410 278 718 410 278 718 410 278 718
N (Episodes) 6223 6223 6223
N (Persons) 6010 6010 6010
Notes:
1. Reference category: no intra-secondary transition or lateral transition (n4647).
2. The results for unclear transitions (fourth category in analyses, n170) are not presented in the table.
3. Because of the small number of transitions the cohorts 193941 and 194951 were collapsed to be used as reference category.
4. Level of significance: P: B0.10; *B0.05; **B0.01; ***B0.001.
5. The odds ratios (relative risks, exp(b)) show by which factor a characteristic raises or lowers the conditional probability of a person to undertake the respective
intra-secondary transition compared with the reference category. Values greater than 1 mean a risk increase, values smaller than 1 mean a risk reduction.















































































































a supplement diploma. This indicates that for children who have been
placed in a track which is not suitable for status maintenance indeed are
pressured to change to a higher track as soon as possible.
We find a strong increase in all types of intra-secondary transitions
across cohorts relative to the reference cohort (1939/41/1949/51), which
is probably due to the fact that only a very small proportion of students in
these cohorts makes an intra-secondary transition. Downgrades and
supplements increase in the cohorts 1954/1955 and 1959/61 and decrease
in later cohorts, without reaching the low level of the reference cohort.
Downgrades reach a peak in the 1964 cohort and decrease for the youngest
cohort as well. This indicates that the reforms did not directly trigger the
incidence of intra-secondary transitions, probably because of the above
mentioned counteracting forces of a better track allocation which make the
correction of initial tracks obsolete. Upward corrections are most likely for
students of the Realschule, while most downgrades occur from the
Gymnasium. This is not particularly surprising as of course, for the
lowest and the highest track ceiling effects and floor effects prevent
upward respectively downward transitions, while from Realschule students
can make upward as well as downward transitions. The incentive to
upgrade from Realschule is quite high, regarding the gain in qualification,
while an upgrade or supplement from Hauptschule to Realschule gives
limited payoff. A better and more popular way to obtain an equivalent
qualification would be to take additional courses during vocational
education. We also assume a more psychological threshold for downgrades
from Realschule to Hauptschule regarding the increasingly bad reputation
of this school type. The introduction of an interaction term of the post-
reform cohort and relative education of the parents reveals that the status
maintenance motive plays a decreasing role in upward corrections after the
reforms, while the effects on downgrades remain stable over time.
In The Netherlands (Table 4), boys have a significantly lower relative
risk to upgrade, while the gender effects are not significant with respect to
downgrades and supplements. Regarding the relative and absolute
education of the parents, we observe similar patterns as in Germany.
For upgrades, neither relative nor absolute parental education has a
significant effect; it has to be acknowledged, however, that the low
statistical power for this contrast (N60) might disguise inherent effects.
Downgrades do not seem to be influenced by family background at all, the
risk (or prevention) of downgrades thus seems to be entirely determined
by the students’ performance. For supplements, we find effects that
resemble those in Germany, next to a strong effect of relative education of
the parents we also find considerable effects of the absolute education,
which indicates that supplements in The Netherlands also are partly, but






































TABLE 4. Intra-secondary transitions (UP upgrades, DN downgrades, SP supplements). multinomial regression (Odds Ratios), robust standard errors,
The Netherlands
Model I Model II Model III
The Netherlands UP DN SP UP DN SP UP DN SP
Sex ( ) 0.499* 0.847 0.962 0.451** 0.813 0.870 0.451** 0.813 0.870
Education parents higher 3.77*** 0.689 2.347*** 1.738 0.858 1.398** 1.636 0.576 1.511**
Parent’s education
Low ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref.
Middle 1.274 0.901 1.701*** 1.287 0.915 1.685***
High 2.947 0.791 2.120*** 2.988 0.807 2.092***
Cohort
193545 ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref.
194650 0.456 1.300 1.122 0.455 1.310 1.118
195155 0.709 1.221 3.257*** 0.712 1.227 3.249***
195660 0.647 1.058 4.665*** 0.651 1.056 4.668***
196165 0.455 1.242 4.141*** 0.429 1.142 4.337***
196670 0.416 0.891 2.636*** 0.388 0.818 2.763***
Initial track resp. first graduation
LBO 0.409*** 0.000 0.306*** 0.409** 0.000 0.306***
MAVO ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. ref.
HAVO 0.335 1.311 0.335*** 0.336** 1.309 0.335***




pseudo R2 0.0136 0.1367 0.1376
















































































































Model I Model II Model III
The Netherlands UP DN SP UP DN SP UP DN SP
N (Events) 60 353 495 60 353 495 60 353 495
N (Episodes) 4637 4637 4637
N (Persons) 4579 4579 4579
Notes:
1. Reference category: no intra-secondary transition or lateral transition (n4675).
2. Level of significance: P: B0.10; *B0.05; **B0.01; ***B0.001.
3. The odds ratios (relative risks. exp(b)) show by which factor a characteristic raises or lowers the conditional probability of a person to undertake the respective
intra-secondary transition compared with the reference category. Values greater than 1 mean a risk increase. values smaller than 1 mean a risk reduction.





















































































downgrades we do not find any significant changes of incidence over time,
relative to the reference cohort (1935/45), but we observe a tendency
towards less upgrades and more downgrades across cohorts. For supple-
ments we find an increase, beginning in the early 1950s, but reaching a
peak in the 1956/60 cohort and a sharp decrease afterwards. As diagnosed
for Germany as well this decrease in later cohorts may reflect the
improved track allocation, counteracting the improved permeability. As in
Germany, the middle track MAVO seems to be the best starting point for
upward corrections, while the risk for downgrades is highest in HAVO
and VWO. This is probably due to the fact that LBO leavers can easily
obtain qualifications equivalent to a MAVO diploma in vocational
education; the incentive to upgrade from LBO is thus limited, while an
upgrade from MAVO results in useful extra qualifications. In The
Netherlands we only observe a trend in effects of relative education of the
parents for downgrades. After the reform the motive of status maintenance
became less important for preventing downward intra-secondary transi-
tions. Interestingly, the patterns in the trends are reverse comparing the
two countries, while we find very similar patterns and magnitudes in the
main effects of relative and absolute parental education between Germany
and The Netherlands in model II. While in Germany the dynamics in
effects of relative education are quite strong for the upward intra-
secondary transitions, thus a strong decrease from a high initial level, we
find weaker main effects for the pre-reform cohorts and no further
decrease after the reforms in The Netherlands.
5. Summary and conclusions
In our theoretical considerations we suggested that the principle of relative
risk aversion in educational decisions is applicable to intra-secondary
transitions in the same way as to scheduled, institutionalised transitions.
We thus proposed that students who are placed in a track below the
educational level of their parents would strive to secure their parents’
status by making an intra-secondary transition to a higher track. We could
confirm this hypotheses only in part. For both countries we found positive
effects of relative parental education on making a supplement, but only for
Germany the effects for upgrades remained significant under control of
cohort and initial track. The relative education of the parents does not
have an influence on downgrades, neither in Germany nor in The
Netherlands. However, for Germany we found negative effects of
the absolute education of the parents on downgrades. While in The
Netherlands downgrading seems to be entirely independent of parental
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education, in Germany children of higher educated parents have
advantages to prevent downgrades.
We found that the patterns in general are very similar comparing the
two countries. However, the general permeability between tracks is higher
in Germany than in The Netherlands. Supplements seem to be about
equally popular in both countries but upgrading is a common strategy to
obtain higher diplomas in Germany, while in The Netherlands only a very
small percentage of upgrades could be observed. For both countries we
found an increase of permeability for cohorts born after 1950.
We compared both countries to examine in how far different
institutional settings affect social selectivity of intra-secondary transitions
before and after educational reforms in the 1960s. Our main conclusion is
that reforms were more effective in Germany than in The Netherlands.
Thus, in Germany, the reforms seem to have the desired effects of
removing barriers for supplements and upgrades and facilitate these.
Upward intra-secondary transitions became more attractive to students
who were not threatened by status demotion, while in The Netherlands,
the positive effect of improved permeability has possibly been offset by
increased opportunity costs for a supplement as stated in our hypotheses.
On the other hand, before the reforms, the level of social selectivity was
considerably higher in Germany than in The Netherlands, so we may also
conclude that The Netherlands successfully follow the strategy of efficient
initial track placement in order to prevent intra-secondary transitions
while facilitating them where necessary. We do find, however, decreasing
effects of relative parental education on downgrades in The Netherlands.
While the downgrade probability used to be driven to a large extent by the
relative education of the parents before the reform, this no longer seems to
be a decisive factor in the decision whether to downgrade or not. In
Germany, to the contrary, the relative education never had a significant
influence on the downgrade probability, neither before nor after the
reform. Considering the general effect of the reforms, we found that
permeability indeed increased, but that this cannot directly be attributed
to the reforms. A considerable increase in upward transitions has taken
place immediately before the reforms came into effect and there is hardly
an additional effect after their actual introduction.
To sum it up, our results complement existing comparative studies on
tracking as we point out differences between similarly tracked systems
regarding track mobility that may partly explain different overall
educational inequalities. In both countries intra-secondary transitions
are a well-established strategy to correct initial track placement, in
particular by children who are placed in lower tracks than their parents’
education. Track mobility is legitimized by the deficient nature of initial






































groups in all tracks. It is beyond the scope of this paper to scrutinize
performance measures, but it would be worthwhile to separate different
types of motivations for track mobility, like those directly related to
performance and those related to relative risk aversion. Focusing on the
educational system, we applied a ‘supply-side’ perspective on educational
outcomes; however, the question if factors of the demand side of the
labour market also influence educational decisions, track mobility and
gaining educational supplements remains open for further research. Thus,
it should be an objective for further research to (re-)model the decision of
track mobility and to gather empirical data on the information and
parameters students, parents / and teachers / actually use in making that
decision.
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